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PRIMA FACIE TORT-A JUDICIAL
REACTION TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
STRIKES IN MISSOURI
State v. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42'
Despite the fact that strikes by public sector employees have been out-
lawed in Missouri and the majority of other states,2 there has been a gradual
increase in the number of such strikes in recent years.3 States have utilized a
number of different sanctions to combat these illegal strikes and maintain un-
interrupted public services.4 These measures, however, have been ineffective in
deterring public employee strikes.
In State v. Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42, the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District sought to provide a solution to illegal public
employee strikes in the vital area of police and firefighter services. This deci-
sion is legally significant in two respects. First, Kansas City Firefighters is the
first Missouri case to allow a public employer to maintain a civil damage ac-
tion against a public employee union for losses resulting from an unlawful
strike.5 Second, while other jurisdictions have allowed civil redress for illegal
public employee strikes, Missouri has become the first jurisdiction to allow a
party injured by an illegal strike to recover under a prima facie tort theory.6
This note will analyze the Kansas City Firefighters decision and its im-
pact and consider generally whether any civil remedy is appropriate for public
employee strikes. More specifically, this note will consider the effects of the
court's expansion of prima facie tort into the public labor context. To accom-
plish this, the note will discuss first the history of the statutory and common
law in Missouri regarding public employee strikes. In addition, the note will
address whether the court is justified in denying all public employees the right
1. 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984).
2. See Note, Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions for Illegal Strikes,
23 B.C.L. REv. 1087 (1982). This comment lists thirty states that expressly prohibit
strikes by all public employees or all classes of public employees covered by the
statutes.
3. The number of public employee strikes since 1965 has increased from 42 in
1965 to 593 in 1979. 71 GOV'T EMPL. REL REP. (BNA) 1014 (1981).
4. The traditional sanctions in this area include injunctions, penalties directed
against employees (dismissal, loss of pay, and imprisonment), and sanctions directed
against the union (decertification, loss of privileges, and fines). See Note, Private Dam-
age Actions Against Public Sector Unions for Illegal Strikes, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1309,
1312 (1978).
5. 672 S.W.2d at 110.
6. Id. at 116.
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to strike. While the court's conclusion in Kansas City Firefighters may be
supported by existing Missouri statutory law, the current statute is an inade-
quate guide for judicial handling of public sector labor disputes.
In Kansas City Firefighters, the Missouri Attorney General brought a
defendant class action suit against the firefighters and their union, Kansas
City Firefighters Local 42, AFL-CIO. The state's suit claimed losses to the
state general revenue fund as a result of a four-day firefighter's strike. This
strike was precipitated by a dispute between the city and the union regarding
parity of pay between the city firefighters and policemen. 7 When an impasse in
negotiations resulted, the union employees, based on the executive board's rec-
ommendations, voted to strike.
On Friday morning, October 3, 1975, the firefighters failed to report for
work, did not respond to fire alarms, and refused to maintain fire equipment.
On the same day, the city reported a state of emergency to the governor, who
ordered the national guard into emergency duty to replace the firefighters. The
guardsmen were withdrawn from the city on October 7, when the union and
the city agreed to arbitrate the matter.8
The class action was a sequel to an earlier action brought by the state on
a quasi-contract theory.9 In the earlier action, the court of appeals reversed a
trial court decision which granted recovery to the state.10 The court of appeals,
however, remanded the case to allow the state to amend its petition to plead a
tort cause of action." On remand, the trial court found for the state and en-
tered a judgment against the union and the firefighters for damages.12 From
this judgment, the union appealed. 13
On appeal, the court was faced with an issue of first impression in Mis-
souri-whether a civil remedy, in addition to traditional remedies of injunc-
tion, contempt, and other sanctions, would be granted to a public employer for
damages resulting from an illegal public employee strike. The state presented
two bases for its recovery. First, it argued that the strike by the firefighters
7. Id. at 104.
8. Id.
9. State ex rel Danforth v. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42, 585 S.W.2d 94
(Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
10. The appellate court concluded that under the theory of quasi-contract
pleaded by the state, "negotiorum gestro," the state was required to prove not only that
the state expected the firefighters union to pay for the services rendered, but also that
the union knew that the services were being rendered with that expectation. Id. at 97.
The court based its conclusion on several facts. First, the governor's proclamation or-
dering the guards into duty specifically provided that the cost of the service would be
paid by the state. Second, the statutory authorization did not indicate that the state
expected to recover the cost from union members. Id.
I1. The court noted that the facts as pleaded might entitle the state to a possi-
ble recovery under per se tort theory. Id. at 98.
12. 672 S.W.2d at 103. The award was for $128,782.72 in compensatory and




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/9
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
was unlawful, both at common law and by statute. 4 Second, it argued that
both the traditional forms of action under the common law prohibition and an
implied right of action from the statutory violation entitled it to tort recovery.
The union argued that the judgment was based neither on any developed prin-
ciples of common law nor on statutory right. It claimed that sound public
policy required the courts to "remain neutral in the delicate balance of public
sector disputes." The union further argued that since the statute granted no
civil remedy, the exclusive remedy must reside in the court's equity powers.',
The court of appeals affirmed 16 the trial court's award, holding that the
firefighters' strike constituted an intentional violation of the Public Sector La-
bor Law,' 7 thereby giving rise to a cause of action in prima facie tort. The
court concluded that the Public Sector Labor Law, like the common law,
made strikes by all public employees illegal.' Violation of the statute, the
court reasoned, gave the state an implied right of action against the union.
The court, however, carefully distinguished the state's claim that the statutory
violation itself was the basis of liability. Rather, it reasoned that the intent to
cause harm to the "public body" was controlling in allowing recovery in prima
facie tort. 19
Currently, public sector labor relations are governed by statute in Mis-
souri.20 Prior to 1965, Missouri, like many other states, lacked any comprehen-
sive statutory scheme for public sector labor relations. Thus, courts developed
the laws and policies that have influenced and guided public sector labor rela-
tions in the state. The tone of these relations was set by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1947 when it decided the landmark case of City of Springfield v.
Clouse.21
In Clouse, the city of Springfield sought a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine its legal power to enter into collective bargaining agreements with city
labor unions. The trial court ruled that the city had no such power." In ad-
dressing this issue, the supreme court interpreted article I, section 29 of the
Missouri Constitution which provides that, "employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing." On its face, this language made no distinction between private and pub-
lic employees, and, arguably, could have been interpreted as granting both
14. Id. at 105.
15. Id. at 104.
16. The court, however, reversed the award of damages against the individual
firefighters since it was not shown which firefighters voted for the strike. The award of
compensatory damages against the union officers was affirmed. However, the case was
remanded for reconsideration in light of the reversal of the award against the firefight-
ers. Id. at 125-26.
17. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1969).
18. Id. at 105.
19. Id. at 110.
20. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500 - .530 (1978).
21. 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947) (en banc).
22. Id. at 1241, 206 S.W.2d at 545.
1985]
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groups the right to organize and to bargain. The supreme court, however, re-
fused to give a literal reading to this language. Rather, it held that the right to
bargain does not extend to public sector employees and that the city could not
lawfully enter into any bargaining contracts with such employees. 23 The court
reasoned that since wages and hours of public employees are fixed by statute
or ordinance, such terms and conditions of employment could not be the sub-
ject of bargaining. The court concluded that such bargaining would be a usur-
pation of legislative powers by executive officers, and, therefore, held that arti-
cle I, section 29 could not reasonably be construed as giving public employees
a right to bargain collectively.2 '
Missouri's first experience with a comprehensive public labor law came in
1965 with the passage of Senate Bill 112.25 The Public Sector Labor Law gave
public employees, with a few exceptions, the right to organize and petition
their employers regarding wages and other conditions of employment.2 6 It pro-
vided for negotiations between the public employer and the union, the results
of which would be reduced to writing and submitted to the "public body" for
appropriate action.2 7 The Act also provided that, "nothing [in this act] shall
be construed as granting a right to public ... employees to strike. 28
The Act, however, was the subject of much criticism. First, some sug-
gested that the Act was not comprehensive enough and gave public employees
no more rights than they had already under the constitution.29 Others argued
that the language of the statute indicated that the authority of the public body
to negotiate was discretionary rather than mandatory,30 thereby implying that
23. Id. at 1244, 206 S.W.2d at 545. The court, however, held that public em-
ployees do have a right to organize. It noted that such rights were granted long before
the passage of article I, § 9 by the first amendment of the United States Constitution
and by the Missouri Constitution of 1945 (which allowed citizens to organize for any
proper purpose). Id. at 1246, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
24. Id. at 1248, 206 S.W.2d at 543.
25. 1965 Mo. Laws 232, codified as Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (Supp.
1965) (repealed in 1967).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.510 provided:
Employees except police, deputy sheriff, Missouri State Highway Patrol, Mis-
souri National Guard, all teachers of all Missouri schools, colleges and uni-
versities, of any public body, shall have the right to form and join labor orga-
nizations and to present proposals to any public body relative to salaries and
other conditions of employment through representatives of their own choosing.
The failure on the legislature's part to grant teachers the right to form unions was a
major criticism of this statute. As noted by one commentator, while there may be some
justification for preventing law enforcement officers and the National Guard from bar-
gaining collectively, "there seems to be no precedent, either in Missouri or anywhere in
the country, upon which the legislature could base its denial of basic constitutional
rights to teachers." Loevi, The Development and Current Application of Missouri
Public Sector Labor Law, 36 Mo. L. REV. 167, 174 (1971).
27. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.520 (Supp. 1965).
28. Id. § 105.530.
29. See Loevi, supra note 26, at 173.
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.520 ("[any public body may engage in negotia-
[Vol. 50
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a public employer could refuse to negotiate with public employee unions. Fi-
nally, critics contended that the Act created no enforcement agency and,
therefore, the courts remained the only means of resolving labor disputes.
31
These concerns led to the Act's repeal in 1967.11
House Bill 166 replaced this act in 1967. 3 Except for one minor amend-
ment,34 this 1967 Act remains the law on public sector labor relations in Mis-
souri. The new Act effectuated a number of important changes, including the
introduction of the State Board of Mediation 35 to resolve issues concerning
unit determinations and majority representation. 6 Another significant change
involved the amendment to section 105.520'which made it mandatory for the
public employer to "meet, confer and discuss" with public employees.37 In ad-
dition, the new Act more clearly outlined the procedure for securing legislative
approval of agreed-to terms.
3 8
Despite these changes in the Public Sector Labor Law, the Act continues
to be the subject of criticism and legislative debate. For instance, although the
Act introduced the State Board of Mediation to handle unit determinations
and majority representation, critics point out that the Act provided no admin-
istrative machinery to deal with violations of the statute by public employers
and employees.39 Another criticism is that the Act declares no public policy
tions") (emphasis added).
31. Loevi, supra note 26, at 174.
32. Id.
33. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1969).
34. In 1969, Senate Bill No. 36 amended § 105.510 as it related to excluded
employees. This change gave excepted employees the right to form "benevolent, social
and fraternal organizations," but not labor unions. Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (1969).
35. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.520 (1969) (currently § 105.525). This five-
member board was established in 1947 by Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 295.010-.210, which
govern public utility labor disputes. For a more thorough discussion of the Board's
functions and its procedures for unit determinations, see Comment, Bargaining Units
for State and Local Employees, 39 Mo. L. REV. 187 (1974).
36. Changes resulted from pressure by non-professional public employee unions
in the state and by the State Labor Council. These groups realized that there could be
no success in public employee bargaining without some method for resolving unit deter-
minations and majority representation questions. One commentator noted that the in-
troduction of the Board was the only real gain to public employees in the act. See
Loevi, supra note 26, at 177.
37. The statutory language was changed from "may engage in negotiations" to
"shall engage in negotiations." Although this change made it mandatory for public
employers to enter into discussions with public employee representatives, the Missouri
Supreme Court, in Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969), held that
"the public employer is not required to agree, only to 'meet, confer and discuss.'" Id.
at 41; see also Loevi, supra note 26, at 179.
38. Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.520 reads, "Upon completion of discussions, the re-
sults shall be reduced to writing and be presented to the appropriate administrative,
legislative or other governing body in the form of an ordinance, resolution, bill or other
form required for adoption, modification or rejection."
39. Even the current machinery has been criticized as inadequate and ineffec-
tive because of underfunding and lack of administrative manpower for the State Board
1985]
5
Norwood: Norwood: Prima Facie Tort--A Judical Reaction
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
nor imposes any sanctions for violations.40 Therefore, the judiciary is responsi-
ble for determining, on a case-by-case basis, what sanctions or remedies will
be available to an aggrieved party. Critics argue that allowing the courts to
decide delicate labor matters on an ad hoc basis, without clear legislative guid-
ance, is an ineffective means of promoting collective bargaining or effectively
resolving labor disputes." Finally, the statute is short-sighted and lags behind
modern developments in other jurisdictions. For example, while a sizable ma-
jority of states allow public employers and employees to enter into binding
collective bargaining agreements, 42 Missouri continues to deny this basic right
to public employees.43
In recent years, there have been numerous, unsuccessful legislative at-
tempts to modify or repeal the Public Sector Labor Law in Missouri.. 4 The
most recent attempt was the introduction of Senate Bill 442 and House Bill
1581. 45 Senate Bill 442 would have effectuated a number of important
changes. For example, the bill would have provided collective bargaining for
public employees and would have given certain classes of public employees the
right to strike. In addition, the bill would have established the Public Employ-
ees Relations Board to handle all disputes between public employers and em-
ployees. 46 House Bill 1581 was introduced, 7 but was later substituted with a
proposal identical to a recently passed Illinois law.'8 Both of the bills died at
of Mediation. These problems led to a backlog and very slow resolution of these repre-
sentation disputes. Consequently, labor leaders are very skeptical about the board's
ability to function adequately. See Loevi, supra note 26, at 185-87. As noted by one
union attorney, the need for prompt resolution of these representation issues is crucial.
"If there is a delay, then there can be an erosion in the support for the union." Clyde
Craig, speaking at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, October 27,
1984.
40. 672 S.W.2d at 105.
41. See, e.g., Note, Public Sector Strikes: Will the Illinois Legislature Answer
the Challenge?, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 869, 871 (1980).
42. Thirty-nine states recognize or authorize a right of collective bargaining for
many lower level public employees. Forty-one states, like Missouri, have statutes which
expressly grant public employees the right to organize. See Note, supra note 4, at
1309-10.
43. See Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41.
44. Since 1969, 56 bills have been introducted in the Missouri General Assem-
bly relating to collective bargaining. LEGISLATION, June 29, 1983, at 2 (published by
the Missouri Chamber of Commerce).
45. S.B. 442, 82d Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1984); LEGISLATION, Feb. 2,
1984, at 2 (published by the Missouri Chamber of Commerce).
46. Id.
47. House Bill 1581 would also have given public employees the right to enter
into binding collective bargaining agreements. Id.
48. LEGISLATION, Feb. 16, 1984, at 1 (published by the Missouri Chamber of
Commerce); see The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 47, §§
1601-27 (Supp. 1983). This act was made effective on July 1, 1984. Prior to its pas-
sage, Illinois had no statute regulating public sector employees, and the courts adhered
to the no-strike rule for all public sector employees. The new statute, however, effectu-
ated some substantial changes. Section 1602 gives public employees the right to organ-
692 [Vol. 50
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the end of the regular legislative session without debate by either the full
house or senate.49
Therefore, while the Missouri legislature continues to grapple with the
problems involving public sector labor relations, the courts retain the power to
administer and interpret the Public Sector Labor Law. It is doubtful that the
Missouri courts will, in the near future, overturn its 1947 Clouse decision and
grant public employees the right to enter into binding collective bargaining
agreements with public employers. 50 Thus, any additional grant of collective
bargaining rights to public employees will have to come from the legislature.
Before determining if a civil remedy would be granted to the state, the
court in Kansas City Firefighters first had to determine whether the strike by
the firefighters was prohibited by the Public Sector Labor Law.51 The control-
ling language in section 105.530 states "Nothing contained in [this act] shall
be construed as granting a right to employees covered in [this act] to strike."
The Missouri courts have interpreted this language to mean that the legisla-
ture intended this section to reinforce the common law rule that public em-
ployees have no right to strike.
52
However, a careful reading of the statute reveals that the language is
subject to two possible interpretations. One can conclude, as the court did,
that the language was intended to prohibit strikes in the public sector. The
language, however, could also be construed to mean that "while the right to
strike has not been granted, neither has it been enjoined. ' 53 The court chose to
follow its earlier precedent which has interpreted the language as a codifica-
tion of the common law prohibition." This interpretation is in accord with the
ize and to bargain collectively for the purpose of negotiating conditions of employment.
Section 1619 gives all public employees, with the exception of security employees, state
peace officers, and firefighters, the right to strike if they follow specified procedures.
For those employees denied the right to strike, the statute provides an "expeditious,
equitable and effective procedure" for resolution of disputes, which includes submitting
the dispute to an impartial arbitrator within 30 days. Id. at § 1602. The act also cre-
ated the Illinois Labor Relations Board, which is granted exclusive jurisdiction over
public sector labor disputes. Id. at § 1605.
49. Critics of the proposal cited the cost of implementation as one of the biggest
problems with the legislation. For example, the estimated cost to the state for imple-
menting Senate Bill 442 was within the range of $370,000 to $14.8 million. LEGISLA-
TION, April 28, 1983, at 2 (published by Missouri Chamber of Commerce).
50. See, e.g., Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc) ("The result [of a proposal] will be an administrative rule, an ordinance, a reso-
lution or something else . . . but it will not be a binding collective bargaining
contract.").
51. Since the civil cause of action has to be implied from a violation of the
Public Sector Labor Law, the prima facie tort theory of recovery would only be availa-
ble to the state if the strikes by the public employees are prohibited by statute or
common law. See Note, supra note 2, at 1092.
52. See St. Louis Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 544 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo.
1976) (en banc).
53. See Loevi, supra note 26, at 176.
54. Kansas City Firefighters, 672 S.W.2d 99, at 105.
1985]
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majority of jurisdictions" and federal legislation.5" A more difficult question,
one which the court did not directly address, is the rationale behind a blanket
prohibition of all public employee strikes.
In determining whether public employees should be given the right to
strike, states have adopted several rationales for either granting or denying
this right.57 The persuasiveness of these arguments vary depending on the stat-
utory language and the underlying policies behind the prohibition. Clearly, the
public has a right to continuous and uninterrupted services without being held
captive by union bargaining demands. On the other hand, public employees,
arguably, should have the same right as private employees to have some means
of influence in determining their terms and conditions of employment.
Two major rationales for prohibiting public employee strikes are the sov-
ereignty doctrine and the essentiality doctrine. Under the sovereignty doctrine,
public employee strikes must be prohibited because they "constitute a denial
of and challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the government." 58 Such
strikes, therefore, deny the government authority to set policy and constitute a
rebellion against the government.5 9 The essentiality rationale states that public
employee strikes should be prohibited because they interrupt services that are
vital to public health, safety, and welfare.60 Thus, because of the public's de-
pendence on essential services, interruption would cause great harm and incon-
venience to the public and give public employees unfair bargaining strength."
In Kansas City Firefighters, the court focuses primarily on whether a
strike by firefighters is grounds for implying a civil damage remedy in light of
statutory prohibition. In this regard, the court noted that the major policy
behind the Public Sector Labor Law is to ensure that vital services are main-
tained, since an interruption could impair the public health and safety. 2 From
the language of the opinion, it appears that the court implicitly adopted the
essentiality rationale as a basis for prohibiting public employee strikes. How-
ever, this reasoning presents a problem. Although the argument of essentiality
55. See supra note 2. Ten states currently permit a limited right to strike by
statute: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Idaho, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pensylvania, Ver-
mont and Wisconsin. Id. at 1087 n.6.
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). At common law, strikes by employees in the
public and private sector were prohibited. See R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR
LAW 1-2 (1976). The common law was superseded as to private employees by § 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), which guaranteed
the right to strike to private sector employees, but not to those in the public sector.
57. See infra notes 59-62.
58. See Note, supra note 4, at 1314.
59. See Cleveland v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees, 41 Ohio Op. 236,
90 N.E.2d 711 (1949).
60. See Note, supra note 4, at 1316.
61. See Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Preven-
tion of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REv. 260 (1969).
62. 672 S.W.2d at 109.
[Vol. 50
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might justify prohibiting strikes by firefighters,63 this rationale is insufficient
justification for an outright prohibition of all public employee strikes." Conse-
quently, the court's failure to distinguish between essential and non-essential
services weakens its justification in continuing a blanket prohibition of public
employee strikes on the basis of "essentiality." 65
Therefore, while the court in Kansas City Firefighters clearly continues to
uphold a blanket prohibition of public employee strikes, the rationale behind
the ban is unclear. Strong support for a no-strike rule for essential employees
like firemen and policemen is easy to find. However, a rigidly applied no-strike
rule for all public employees draws very little support in light of modern day
collective bargaining principles.
Having decided that the firefighters had no lawful right to strike, the
court in Kansas City Firefighters next determined whether the statutory viola-
tion gave the state a civil remedy. The court first noted that the Public Sector
Labor Law does not expressly enumerate sanctions or remedies for its viola-
tion. 6 This legislative silence, it concluded, gave the court authority, not only
to impose sanctions, but also to fashion an appropriate remedy for aggrieved
parties. 17
63. One commentator had criticized the essentiality rationale because it does
not reflect the true nature of most government services. He argues that no government
service is totally indispensible, noting that in 1978, there were 36 strikes nationally by
police and firemen. See Note, supra note 40, at 886.
64. "Where collective bargaining procedures [had] been exhausted and public
health, safety or welfare is not endangered, it is inequitable and unwise to prohibit
strikes . . . the collective bargaining process will be strengthened if this qualified right
to strike is recognized." GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LAW
OF PA., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 251 (July 1, 1968).
65. The Missouri Supreme Court's language in Clouse could provide another
possible justification for prohibition in non-essential areas. In that opinion, the court's
reasoning for denying collective bargaining agreements is couched in language indicat-
ing support for the sovereignty doctrine, which would support a blanket prohibition of
all public employee strikes. Clouse, 356 Mo. at 1257, 206 S.W.2d at 545. This doc-
trine, however, has found little judicial support. See Note, supra note 40, at 883
("[tihe rubric of sovereign immunity leaves collective bargaining a hollow right"); see,
e.g., Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. City of Anderson, 242 Ind. 558, 569, 251 N.E.2d
15, 20 (1969) ("The conflict of real social forces cannot be solved by invocation of
magical phrases like 'sovereignty.' ").
66. 672 S.W.2d at 108. The court noted that unfair labor practice disputes tra-
ditionally have been administered by the courts rather than an administrative agency.
The court further reasoned that from the authority to administer comes the power to
impose sanctions and other remedies which effectuate the policies underlying the Public
Sector Labor Law. Id. See Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo. 1969);
City of Webster Groves v. Institutional Employees Union, 524 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1975).
67.
[T]hat the legislature relinquished to the courts authority to declare policy,
administer the law and give remedies for breach implies rather an intent also
that the courts fashion a private cause of action to give full effect to the policy
of the enactment-especially where the judicial sanctions available do not
19851
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The court relied on the doctrine of implied right6 8 to conclude that the
unlawful fighters' strike gave rise to a civil remedy. Under this doctrine, a
court may imply a civil cause of action from the violation of a statute which
does not expressly specify a remedy.6" In determining whether to imply a civil
cause of action, a court must determine if such an action was intended, either
expressly or impliedly, by the legislature.7 0 The court must also conclude that
the statute was intended to benefit the particular plaintiff and that a civil rem-
edy furthers the policies and enforcement of the statute.7 1
In Kansas City Firefighters, the court noted that the statute declares no
public policy.7 2 However, it reasoned that one policy implicit in the statute is
to ensure the continuity of services that are vital to the public health and
safety.7 3 The court concluded that, since the firefighters strike posed an imme-
diate threat to the public, a civil remedy against the fire fighters and its union
would serve two important functions. First, it would serve to ensure that essen-
tial firefighter services are protected. Second, the remedy would deter fire
fighters from striking-an act which would almost certainly cause harm to
persons and property.74 However, before concluding that such a remedy was
available to the state, the court considered whether the state was one of the
class for whose benefit the Public Sector Labor Law was enacted.7 5
suffice for that purpose.
672 S.W.2d at 109.
68. The state argued that in order to give full effect to the statute, a civil cause
of action is implied from a violation of the statute. Id. at 107. It claimed that one
policy implicit in the statute is to provide a tort remedy to any party damaged as a
result of the firefighters strike. The private cause of action, it argued, arises per se
because of the statutory prohibition. The state relied on the per se tort theory of recov-
ery used by the California courts. See Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n
of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1977) (liability on a
civil cause of action arises per se from a violation of the statute without considering the
policy or intent of the statute).
69.
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by prohibiting or re-
quiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation,
the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in the further-
ance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of
the provision, accord an injured member of the class a right of action using a
suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing
tort action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1977); see also Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo.
1187, 1192, 295 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1956) (en banc).
70. See, e.g., Christy, 365 Mo. at 1192, 295 S.W.2d at 126; Teal v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co., 66 II. 2d 1, 2, 359 N.E.2d 473, 474 (1976).
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1977); see Note, supra note 4,
at 1313-14; Note, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
72. 672 S.W.2d at 108.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id. at 110.
75. Id. There are three ways that a court can determine if the legislature in-
tended to benefit a particular person, class, or entity. First, a court can look to the
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The court analyzed the statutory language and concluded that the public
employer was an intended beneficiary. As noted by the court, "the text of the
[statute] discloses that the prohibition against strikes by public employees was
enacted for the benefit of the public body-that is, the public employer.17 6
The problem with the court's analysis here is that the statutory language re-
lied upon merely defines the "public body." A close examination does not indi-
cate whether the public employer was an intended beneficiary of the statute
for the purposes of implying a civil remedy.77
However, having decided that the statute was enacted to benefit the pub-
lic employer, thereby entitling it to a civil cause of action, the court then had
to determine if such a cause of action accrued to the state. Under the court's
reasoning, the state "stands in the stead of the municipal public employer, not
as a third party,7 8 but as a surrogate to any cause of action under the stat-
ute."17 9 Thus, since the state provided services that the city would have had to
provide, this factor entitles the state to sue in the city's place.8 0
legislative history of the statute. Note, supra note 4, at 1313; Note, supra note 2, at
1095. The court in Kansas City Firefighters did not have much legislative history to
rely on to determine for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Thus, the court foregoes
any historical analysis.
Second, a court can examine the rationale behind the statute to determine who the
legislature intended to benefit and what goals the legislature hoped to achieve in enact-
ing the statute. Note supra at note 4, at 1314; Note, supra note 2, at 1094. For exam-
ple, under one rationale, the intended beneficiary is the member of the public who
would be subject to harm or inconvenience. This rationale suggests, as the state
claimed, that any third party injured as a result of the strike would have a private right
of action. Note, supra note 2, at 1094.
A court can also interpret the language of the statute to determine who the legisla-
ture intended to benefit. Note, supra note 2, at 1093. An examination of the statutory
scheme could reveal that the legislature had more than one objective. Thus, it is possi-
ble to conclude that the statute was enacted to benefit both the public and the public
employer. See, e.g., Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173,
178 (1973) (court recognized that the purpose of a statute prohibiting public employee
strikes is, inter alia, to protect the public by assuring uninterrupted government
operations).
76. 672 S.W.2d at 110.
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.500 provides: "Unless the context otherwise requires,
the following words and phrases mean . . . (3) "Public Body" means the state of Mis-
souri, or any officer, agency, department, bureau, division, board or commission of or
within the state."
78. The court noted that the few states and decisions dealing with the issue of
whether to extend civil liability, limit that cause of action to public employers and
exclude third parties. 672 S.W.2d at 111; see also Pasadena Unified School Dist. v.
Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977);
Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Local 1784, 649 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1982).
79. 672 S.W.2d at 110.
80. The court apparently reasoned that municipalities are mere political subdi-
visions of the state. Therefore, the state can sue in the place of the city since such a
cause of action would have entitled the city, as public employer, to sue for damages.
See City of Mountlake Terrace v. Wilson, 15 Wash. App. 392, 549 P.2d 497 (1976)
(city is a mere political subdivision of the state and cannot challenge state retirement
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In reaching the conclusion that an implied civil action arose from the
illegal firefighters strikes, the court emphasized that the traditional injunc-
tions, fines, and contempt remedies had not deterred firefighters from strik-
ing."' Therefore, the court held that a civil damage action should be granted to
the state to effectuate the policy and intent of the Public Sector Labor Law.
8 2
By granting the state a civil remedy for the firefighters' illegal strike, the
court has achieved at least two purposes. First, the court has broadened its
enforcement powers where traditional sanctions and remedies may be ineffec-
tive in providing adequate protection for vital public services. For example, the
traditional remedy of injunction may be inadequate, especially where the
strike lasts only a few days, but causes considerable damage. 83 Also, an injunc-
tion, usually imposed just prior to or during the strike, may actually serve to
increase union militancy. 4 In addition, contempt remedies for violation of the
injunction may be impractical.8" Even mandatory fines may be useless because
the financial gains which the union hopes to achieve by striking may outweigh
the cost of the fine.86 Therefore, where traditional sanctions and remedies have
been insufficient in effectuating statutory policy, the imposition of a civil dam-
age remedy could provide additional judicial muscle.87
Second, the imposition of a civil damage remedy might deter public em-
ployees from striking in the future.88 The fear of large damage suits by the
public employer or third parties could help prevent strikes.89 Thus, a civil rem-
edy, in addition to specified sanctions, could force union officials to think long
and hard before authorizing a strikeY0
system); Becker v. Adams, 37 N.J. 337, 181 A.2d 349 (1962) (state legislative control
over cities is almost unlimited as municipal corporations are merely political subdivi-
sions of the state).
81. 672 S.W.2d at 110.
82. Id. at 109. The court in Kansas City Firefighters, however, carefully nar-
rowed its holding in two ways. First, the court did not address whether the Public
Sector Labor Law benefited any third party other than the public employer. Second,
the court declined to decide whether every public employee strike in violation of the
Public Sector Labor Law automatically gives the public employer a civil cause of ac-
tion. Rather, the court emphasized that, "we confine our analysis to the public em-
ployee function in suit-firefighters." Id. at 111.
83. See, e.g., Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 92 Wash.
2d 762, 763-65, 600 P.2d 1282, 1283-84 (1979) (a two day Labor Day weekend strike
by public ferry workers, although it ended before an injunction could be issued, caused
over a million dollars in damages to local businesses).
84. See Note, supra note 4, at 1319.
85. See id.
86. See Comment, supra note 4, at 268.
87. "Indeed a major justification for the implication doctrine is its utility in
providing a supplementary enforcement mechanism in light of experience as to the effi-
cacy of the explicit statutory enforcement procedures." Note, supra note 4, at 1318.
88. See Note, supra note 2, at 1096.
89. See Note, supra note 4, at 1319.
90. See Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 1980-81 Pub.
Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37, 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981). Plaintiff asked for
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However, the consequences of imposing a civil damage remedy could be
undesirable. For instance, the availability of a civil damage action to employ-
ers and third parties could prolong the strike since the union will undoubtedly
include a demand for indemnification as a condition for settlement. 9' A civil
damage action could also upset the harmonious working relationship between
the public employer and its employees. Thus, after a strike, there could be
resentment among public employees as they work to pay off long-term judg-
ments. 92 Finally, by imposing a civil damage remedy, a court could cause an
imbalance in the bargaining power of public employers and employees.
9 3
After concluding that the illegal strike by the fire fighters gave rise to an
implied civil remedy, the court in Kansas City Firefighters then had to deter-
mine which tort recovery it would allow. The possible theories of recovery
available were intentional interference with a contract, tortious inducement of
breach of contract, nuisance, tort per se, and prima facie tort.
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Clouse foreclosed any recovery
under either tortious interference with a contract or tortious inducement of
breach of contract.9 The court, however, rejected both of these as possible
bases of recovery because of Clouse, which held that negotiations between a
public employer and employees cannot result in a binding contract.9 5 This lim-
itation also ruled out other possible contractual remedies such as breach of
contract or the use of third party beneficiary theory. 98
Similarly, the court rejected nuisance as a possible theory of recovery. As
$50 million per day for the 11 day strike. The union's attorney warned that if the
damages were granted "the unions are out of business." Id.
91. For example, one of the conditions by the fire fighters union was that the
city would not bring suit against the strikers or the union. Kansas City Times, Oct. 7,
1975, at 1, col. 5; see Note, supra note 4, at 1320.
92. See Comment, Parent Union Liabilities for Strikes in Breach of Contract,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1028, 1032 (1979) (post-strike damages could impair industrial
harmony).
93. See Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 130,
252 N.W.2d 818, 830 (1977). In Lamphere, the court noted that "the ultimate legisla-
tive goal is to achieve a prompt, fair resolution of disputes while avoiding disruption
• . . to recogize alternative tort remedies would result in a substantial negative impact
upon such purposes." Id.
94. Tortious interference with a contract occurs when a person intentionally and
improperly interfers with the performance of a contract by causing a party not to per-
form. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1977). Under this theory, the
union would be liable since it encouraged the fire fighters to strike, thus making it
impossible to fulfill their contractual obligations. In contrast, tortious inducement of
breach of contract occurs when a person intentionally and without justification, per-
suades or induces another party to breach a contractual duty owed to a third party. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, comment h (1979). Here the inducement by
the union to go on strike, resulting in a breach of a contractual obligation would be the
basis of recovery.
95. See 206 S.W.2d at 545.
96. Note, supra note 2, at 1131.
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noted by the court, a nuisance can be both public and private.97 A public nui-
sance results when there is an unreasonable interference with the exercise of a
right common to all members of the public.98 The court rejected this as a basis
of recovery since the invasion of a public right merely constitutes a petty crim-
inal offense, enjoinable by the public employer."
Another possible theory of recovery, one principally relied on by the state,
was the doctrine of per se tort. This doctrine was applied for the first time in
the public sector labor context in Pasadena Unified School District v.
Pasadena Federation of Teachers, Local 1050,1°° where the court held that an
illegal strike by union employees, which constituted a statutory violation, re-
sulted in damages recoverable by the city.10' In Pasadena, the court reasoned
that the unlawful act itself was a tort. 102 The court in Kansas City Firefighters
declined to accept that court's rationale since, traditionally, Missouri courts
have held that not every violation of a statute automatically gives rise to a civil
remedy. 0 3
Having foreclosed all traditional tort remedies, the court concluded that
since the legislature intended some kind of remedy, relief in the form of prima
facie tort was available to the state. 04 The major purpose behind the prima
facie tort doctrine is to provide an injured party some form of recovery when
no traditional tort action permits recovery. 05 Under this doctrine, a defendant
may incur liability if he intends to injure the plaintiff even if defendant en-
gages in otherwise lawful conduct.'06
This theory was recently recognized by the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District in Porter v. Crawford.0 7 In that case, the court chose to
adopt the more flexible approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts rather
97. 672 S.W.2d at 114.
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
99. 672 S.W.2d at 114. Although public nuisance can be grounds for a private
damage recovery, the court noted that there was no showing of a particular injury of a
kind not shared by the public, a prerequisite to such recovery. Id. Rather, the suit by
the state was for reimbursement to the state general revenue fund for damages result-
ing from the illegal strike. Id.
100. 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
101. Id. at 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
102. Id. at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
103. See Christy, 365 Mo. at 1192, 295 S.W.2d at 126.
104. 672 S.W.2d at 115.
105. Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in Missouri: Commission of a Law-
ful Act with Intent to Injure May Result in Liability, 50 UMKC L. REv. 128 (1981).
106. Id.
107. 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980). In Porter, plaintiff sued defen-
dant insurance company for damage resulting from defendant's stop payment placed on
a check issued to plaintiff. The court held that although defendant engaged in an other-
wise lawful act, the intent to stop payment led to foreseeable injuries to plaintiff. Thus,
the court, relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870, ruled that the unjusti-
fied conduct constituted a prima facie tort. See Note, Prima Facie Tort Recogized in
Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 533, 554 (1980).
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than the more restrictive view applied by the New York courts." 8 Under the
Restatement view, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant intended to
cause him injury, that the injury has in fact resulted, and that the defendant
was without excuse or justification. 10 9
In Kansas City Firefighters, the court found that the union and the
firefighters had the requisite intent to justify granting the state recovery in
prima facie tort. The court reasoned that the withholding of essential services
led to a presumption of harm intended to the "public body."110 It placed par-
ticular emphasis on the fact that the union solicited commitments from area
firefighters not to enter into the city and that the firefighters sabotaged fire
equipment during the walkout.1 Thus, by intentionally engaging in an illegal
strike, the court concluded that the consequences were indeed an intended
result.112
The effect of applying the prima facie tort doctrine in the public labor
context is unclear since Missouri is the first state to allow prima facie tort
recovery and since application of the doctrine is quite unsettled in this state.
From the standpoint of public employees and unions in this state, the exten-
sion of prima facie tort into this area represents a further tightening of the
noose around the neck of public employee bargaining rights. Now, not only do
public employee unions have to contend with unenforceable bargaining agree-
ments, legislative reluctance to reform public sector legislation, and prohibi-
tion of strikes for both essential and non-essential services, they also must now
fear the imposition of huge damage suits for losses resulting from their at-
tempts to influence terms and conditions of employment. One possible effect is
that now public employers in Missouri need not worry about reaching a nego-
tiated settlement since any losses resulting from public employee strikes can be
recouped under the umbrella of prima facie tort recovery.
On the other hand, the use of a prima facie tort remedy could be a means
of protecting needed public services and allowing public employers to recover
108. Traditionally, the New York federal district courts have placed a number of
limitations on their application of the prima facie tort doctrine. For instance, in order
to incur liability, defendant must have a sole malicious motive that is unmixed by any
other motive. See, e.g., Sadowy v. Sony Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). These courts have also denied recovery under the prima facie tort doctrine
where injuries were recoverable under traditional tort. See, e.g., Smith v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 444 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y 1978).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1977); see also Note, Prima Fa-
cie Tort, 11 CuM. L. REV. 113, 120-24 (1980).
110. 672 S.W.2d at 112.
111. Id. at 116. The court also emphasized the fact that all of these illegal acts
were done after the issuance of an injunction.
112. Id. The court relied on two New York decisions as a basis for allowing
recovery in prima facie tort. Although these decisions did not actually grant recovery
under prima facie tort theory, they recognized it as a possible theory of recovery for
unlawful public employee strikes. See Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v.
Linder, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983); Jamur Prods.
Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
1985]
15
Norwood: Norwood: Prima Facie Tort--A Judical Reaction
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
losses to the taxpayers resulting from public employee strike activity. As noted
by the court, the prima facie tort remedy is well-suited for public employee
strikes.113 This conclusion might be well-founded, particularly in cases like
Kansas City Firefighters, where the public employer would not be able to re-
cover under traditional 'remedies. There is little doubt that the flexibility of the
prima facie tort doctrine can be an important means of allowing the public
employer to recover losses resulting from an illegal strike and a powerful
weapon against public sector strikes which threaten the public health and
safety.
However, such remedies are merely short-term solutions to very compli-
cated and delicate labor matters. What is needed more is reform of the cur-
rent Public Sector Labor Law by the legislature. While a detailed discussion
of an ideal statutory model is beyond the scope of this note, at a minimum,
there should be included a right for public employee unions to enter into bind-
ing collective bargaining agreements. 14 By carefully eliminating the inherent
ambiguities and other shortcomings in the statute and by making the law more
equitable to public employees, the legislature could protect vital public ser-
vices, and, at the same time, provide public employees with a realistic and
speedy method for addressing serious labor concerns. Such prompt legislative
action would eliminate the need to search for new remedies in an area where
careful balancing of the competing and equally justified interests of the public,
the public employer, and the public employees is essential.
The issues raised in Kansas City Firefighters illustrate some of the com-
plex and delicate problems involving public sector labor relations in Missouri.
In addition, the case demonstrates the ambiguities and incompleteness of the
current Public Sector Labor Law. These statutory problems place an added
burden on the courts to fill gaping holes in the statute and to formulate patch-
work remedies and rationales on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Such an ap-
proach can be detrimental to public employer-employee relations and to the
resolution of public labor disputes.
The use of a prima facie tort remedy in the public labor context could
serve to protect vital public services and deter public employee strikes. How-
ever, the way in which the court had to strain to find a remedy in Kansas City
Firefighters points to the need for clearer, more comprehensive legislation cov-
ering public sector labor relations. Meanwhile, public employee unions will be
113. 672 S.W.2d at 115.
114. Such a statutory scheme could be some variation of Senate Bill 442 or the
recently passed Illinois Act. See supra note 4871. Although there could be some addi-
tional costs in implementing changes in the current law, the courts could be aided in
their interpretation by clear legislative guidelines. Also, the public employer, employee,
and the public also could be benefited since such reform would be more conducive to
the expedient resolution of public labor disputes.
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